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THE TIES OF NATURAL JUSTICE: RESTORING
QUANTUM MERUIT FOR CONTRACTORS IN
WASHINGTON
Adam B. Brotman
Abstract: Under Washington case law, quantum meruit is an appropriate means of
recovery for contractors when substantial changes occur that are not covered by the contract
and were not contemplated by the parties. The Nelse Mortensen and Hensel Phelps decisions
severely limited quantum meruit by precluding contractors from recovering under this
doctrine as a matter of law. This Comment examines how these two cases are at odds with the
historical and philosophical underpinnings of quantum meruit, and with the Washington
Supreme Court's decision in Berg v. Hudesman. Rather than apply Hensel Phelps's plain
meaning analysis, future quantum meruit decisions should follow Berg's lead and interpret the
parties' intentions in the context of their overall relationship.
If contract remedies were limited to protecting the expectation
interests of the parties, awarding contract damages would be a relatively
straightforward process. However, courts must take into account many
countervailing forces when providing relief in contract disputes.
Quantum meruit is one such force, and literally means "as much as
deserved." Although quantum meruit has many different meanings in
many different contexts, this Comment will specifically examine
quantum meruit in the context of Washington construction litigation.
Under Washington case law, quantum meruit is an appropriate means
of recovery for contractors in certain limited circumstances. Contractors
are entitled to abandon the terms of their contracts and recover the
reasonable value of their performance when substantial changes occur
that are not covered by the contract and were not contemplated by the
parties. Two cases have muddied this doctrine, however, by straying
from principles previously set out by Washington courts. These cases
are Nelse Mortensen & Co. v. Group Health Cooperative' and Hensel
Phelps Construction v. King County.' Owners3 in Washington rejoiced
because they believed that these cases dealt a severe blow to quantum
1. 17 Wash. App. 703, 566 P.2d 560 (1977). This opinion was adopted by the Washington
Supreme Court with accompanying clarifying text at 90 Wash. 2d 843, 586 P.2d 469 (1978).
2. 57 Wash. App. 170, 787 P.2d 58 (1990).
3. The word "owner" in this Comment primarily refers to the person or company desiring to own
a new structure. The term "owner" may also refer to a contractor dealing with a subcontractor.
However, it should be noted that construction contracts are not limited to new structures. They may
involve remodeling, tearing down old structures, improving roads, or any combination of these and
other tasks.
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meruit by precluding contractors from recovering under this doctrine as a
matter of law. In fact, a national construction law treatise heralded
Hensel Phelps as a triumph for owners and perhaps the beginning of the
end for quantum meruit recovery in Washington.4 However, the
Washington Supreme Court explicitly rejected the plain meaning
approach to contract interpretation taken by Hensel Phelps in Berg v.
Hudesman.5 In addition, a recent court of appeals decision involving
quantum meruit may have limited Hensel Phelps to its facts.6 These
apparently conflicting decisions have resulted in uncertainty and
confusion for litigants.
This Comment suggests a means of clarifying the doctrine of quantum
meruit as applied to construction litigation in Washington. First, it will
examine the equitable history of the doctrine of quantum meruit.
Second, it will analyze the line of Washington cases addressing quantum
meruit in the area of construction litigation. Third, it will explain why
Nelse Mortensen, and especially Hensel Phelps, should be seen as
misapplications of quantum meruit, and why thes3e decisions take an
unrealistic approach to contract interpretation in construction litigation.
Finally, this Comment will offer a proposal for the lxeatment of quantum
meruit claims in the future.
I. THE EQUITABLE HISTORY OF QUANTUM MERUIT
An examination of England's historical development of remedies is
necessary in order to understand the conceptual foundations of quantum
meruit. Common law courts began as a result of the Magna Carta, which
declared that appeals to justice should no longer be the king's
responsibility alone.7 While the king filled these common law courts
with justices to hear the common pleas, there remained a privy council
(or "chancery") that handled matters concerning royal documents such as
charters, writs, and grants!
4. Bradley H. Bagshaw, Quantum Meruit, in 1991 Wiley Constrction Law Update 187, 199
(Steven M. Goldblatt ed.). This treatise went so far as to state that because of Hensel Phelps, if the
contract unambiguously deals with changes, "the court will not resort :o quantum meruit, regardless
of how severe conditions become on the job." Id.
5. 115 Wash. 2d 657, 801 P.2d 222 (1990).
6. Douglas Northwest v. O'Brien & Sons, 64 Wash. App. 661, 828 P.2d 565 (1992).
7. Judy Beckner Sloan, Quantum Meruit: Residual Equity in Law, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 399, 404
(1992).
8. Id. A charter is an instrument emanating from the sovereign pcwer, in the nature of a grant,
either to the whole nation, or to a class or portion of the people, to a corporation, or to a colony or
dependency, assuring to them certain rights, liberties, or powers. Black's Law Dictionary 235 (6th
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The common law courts were rigid and inflexible, adamantly refusing
to diverge from their formal system of writs and precedents. In contrast,
the chancery court was more flexible and adapted its laws, procedures,
and remedies in order to provide the most equitable results.' Thus, two
separate court systems were available to an aggrieved party: one in the
courts at law that provided little flexibility and often left parties without a
remedy, and the other in the chancery that provided a forum for
achieving fair or equitable results. For obvious reasons, aggrieved
parties soon began running to the chancery as their court of first resort."
After Slade's Case" in 1602, the common law courts were anxious to
offer the same equitable remedies as the chancery courts.' 2 By allowing
recovery in quantum meruit, the common law courts appropriated the
substance of the equitable remedy of restitution by pretending that all
contracts included a fictional promise that in the event of a breach, the
breaching party would pay the reasonable value of any performance
rendered by the nonbreaching party. 3 Thus, quantum meruit in its
original sense was merely a legal form of equitable restitution."
Lord Mansfield, an eighteenth century jurist, explained these new
developments in the common law in terms of their restitutionary nature
and found a basis for them in Roman law. 5 In words that capture the
equitable ancestry of quantum meruit, Mansfield explained that "if the
defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of natural justice, to
ed. 1990). The original writ was a mandatory letter from the king, issuing out of chancery, which
was used in English practice for the commencement of personal actions. Id. at 1608.
9. Sloan, supra note 7, at 404-05.
10. Id. at 404.
11. 76 Eng. Rep. 1072 (K.B. 1602). Prior to Slade's Case, a defendant could escape liability for a
debt by securing twelve persons who would swear they believed the defendant told the truth in
denying that he owed the debt; this was known as a "wager of law." The judges deciding Slade's
Case rejected this irrational system for resolving contract disputes, and made available to litigants a
remedy for collecting debts in which disputes over facts would be decided by juries. Slade's Case
thus transformed indebitatus assumpsit (general assumpsit) into a complete substitute for debt. John
P. Dawson, et al., Cases and Comment on Contracts 103-04 (5th ed. 1987).
12. Arthur Rosett, Contract Lav and Its Application 341 (4th ed. 1988). See also Sloan, supra
note 7, at 423.
13. Rosett, supra note 12, at 340-41.
14. Sloan, supra note 7, at 431.
15. Id. at 424. In fact, the principle at the heart of restitution is as ancient as Aristotle. Aristotle
saw all wrongful acts as disturbing the equilibrium of the distribution of goods among members of
society because they tended to produce equal gain to the wrongdoer and loss to the victim. Louis E.
Wolcher, The Accommodation of Regret in Contract Remedies, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 797, 810 n.59
(1988).
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refund; the law implies a debt, and gives this action founded in the equity
of the plaintiff's case, as it were upon a contract."'
16
One explanation for allowing the nonbreaching party to abandon the
contract in favor of a recovery in quantum meruit is; that a breach after
partial performance was not in the contemplation of the parties. It
offends notions of "natural justice" to allow a breaching party to obtain
goods and services for a price less than their reasonable value by virtue
of the breach itself. Thus, courts use quantum meruit to require the
breaching party to relinquish unjustified benefits in those situations
where the contract does not govern the performance in any realistic
sense.
17
II. THE LINE OF QUANTUM MERUIT CONSTRUCTION CASES
IN WASHINGTON
Quantum meruit recovery in Washington construction cases, although
often involving full performance, 8 is a spin-off of this type of
restitutionary theory.'9 Quantum meruit has spawned confusion among
judges and lawyers alike because courts find themselves applying an
equitable remedy in the face of an express contract between the parties.20
Consequently, Washington quantum meruit cases in the area of
construction litigation appear on the surface to be a discordant strain.
However, with an eye to the equitable history of quantum meruit, the
apparent contradiction in these cases between contractual and equitable
remedies can be reconciled.
16. Moses v. MacFerlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
17. Rosett, supra note 12, at 341.
18. By allowing recovery in quantum meruit notwithstanding full performance, Washington
courts have decided to stray from the traditional rule limiting a plaintiffwho has fully performed to a
remedy "on the contract," not in quantum memit. See Dawson, et al., supra note 11, at 100.
19. See Dravo Corp. v. L.W. Moses Co., 6 Wash. App. 74,90,492 P.2d 1058, 1069 (1971).
20. Rosett noted that "[ulse of this fiction, sometimes called 'quasi contract,' provided judges
with a flexible tool to do justice, but muddied the conceptual stream of the law to the chagrin of law
professors and the dismay of students." Rosett, supra note 12, at 341. See also Sloan, supra note 7,
at 462 ("quantum meruit is not a dead issue-it simply is struggling beneath its own complexity.").
434
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A. The General Facts of a Typical Construction-Related Quantum
Meruit Claim
Before examining Washington's line of quantum meruit construction
cases, it may be helpful to briefly describe a construction contract.2'
While a construction contract often involves multiple parties and several
layers of contractors and subcontractors, at its lowest common
denominator it involves an owner' and a contractor (the person or
company desiring to build the new structure). At the outset, owners
advertise their desire to own a structure that will be built pursuant to a set
of contract documents. These contract documents often include design
specifications, as well as standard terms of the contract. Based on these
documents, various contractors submit price offers, known as bids, to the
owner. The owner then accepts the most favorable bid and agrees to
contract with the contractor.
In order to submit an accurate bid, the contractor must study the
contract documents and calculate the costs of labor, material, equipment,
overhead, and profit. The contractor relies on the fact that the design
specifications will be constructable and accurate. Moreover, the
contractor assumes that the design is complete and that the owner will
not ask the contractor to deviate substantially from the provided design.
Thus, before even putting the first shovel in the ground, the contractor
offers to custom build a structure for a fixed sum of money. In this
sense, the contractor is put in a precarious position.'
B. Pre-Nelse Mortensen Cases Focused on the Intentions of the
Parties
The seminal Washington decision applying quantum meruit in a
construction claim is Tribble v. Yakima Valley Transportation Co.24 In
Tribble, the Washington Supreme Court held that quantum meruit was
hppropriate when railroad track contractors alleged that the owner
changed the line and grade of the track such that the contractors were
forced to remove 25 times more earth material than expected from the
21, This section is no way intended to be a comprehensive explanation of all construction
contracts. There are as many different fact patterns as there are contracts.
22. See supra note 3.
23. This is not to say the owner is in a risk-free position. For example, owners rely on
contractors' abilities to produce quality work in the time specified, and count on the integrity of the
contractor to address problems in a manner consonant with honesty and good faith.
24. 100 Wash. 589, 171 P. 544(1918).
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job site.' The contract in Tribble contained a clause specifically
addressing the possibility that the owner could change the line and
grade.26
The court found that the contractor's quantum meruit claim hinged
upon whether the work eventually performed was beyond the reasonable
contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered into.27
The court explained that when quantum meruit is appropriate, the law
releases the parties from their original written contract and leaves them to
their remedies and defenses under what is in legal effect a new contract.28
Because the court found the issue of the parties' contemplation to be a
proper question for the jury, it affirmed the v.-rdict allowing the
contractors to recover the reasonable value of :removing the extra
material.
29
The next case in this line, Schuehle v. City of Seattle,30 involved a
bridge contractor who also was allowed recovery in quantum meruit
because the owner sought to gain an advantage that was beyond the
intentions of the parties. Seattle decided to downsize a bridge project,
which in turn affected the way in which the contractor had planned to
build the bridge. The supreme court held that the changes ordered by the
city were not minor or inconsequential changes necessary for the
practical performance of the contract,31 but were made in order to give
the city an advantage not found in the contract.32 Of course, the court did
not literally mean that the advantage was absent from the face of the
contract documents. Rather, the court meant that the advantage was not
within that bundle of legal rights and obligations that formed the more
abstract contract between the parties."
25. Id. at 590-91, 171 P. at 545.
26. Id. at 593, 171 P. at 546. Other Washington cases also allowed recovery in quantum meruit
despite a contractual provision that seemed to cover the disputed changes. See, e.g., Schuehle v.
City of Seattle, 199 Wash. 675, 684,92 P.2d 1109, 1113 (1939).
27. Tribble, 100 Wash. at 597, 171 P. at 547.
28. Id. at 605, 171 P. at 549. See also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
29. Tribble, 100 Wash. at 595, 597, 171 P. at 546, 547.
30. 199 Wash. 675, 92 P.2d 1109 (1939).
31. Id. at 680-81, 92 P.2d at 1111.
32. Id. at 682, 92 P.2d at 1112.
33. The contract and contract documents are not necessarily the same thing. A contract, in its
abstract sense, is not necessarily a tangible item. A contract is "an agreement between two or more
persons which creates an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing." Black's Law Dictionary
322 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, parties come together and contract with one another, and attempt to
integrate their intentions in the contract documents. These contract do.-uments are often referred to
as the "contract."
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In 1973, in Edwards Contracting Co. v. Port of Tacoma,3 4 the
supreme court once again upheld recovery in quantum meruit, this time
for a contractor constructing a rail service yard. Although the original
contract documents contemplated that the project would cross a different
sewer construction project only five times, the contractor's work actually
was delayed due to conflicts with the sewer project on more than 30
occasions. The trial court found that the delays "demolished" the
contractor's intended time and cost projections.35 On review, the
supreme court held that the critical factor in application of quantum
meruit is whether the contractor should have discovered or anticipated
the changed condition.36 The court found this was properly resolved as a
question of fact, and thus allowed recovery in quantum meruit.37
C. Nelse Mortensen and Hensel Phelps Focused on the Contract
Documents
In 1977, the Washington Court of Appeals denied quantum meruit
recovery in Nelse Mortensen & Co. v. Group Health Cooperative.38
After examining several cases in which contractors had alleged damages
from owner-caused delays, the court stated that the one controlling factor
in each case had been the presence or absence of a clause that limited or
barred the contractor's claim for damages.39 According to the court, in
every case in which recovery was allowed in quantum meruit, there had
been no such limiting clause.4"
The supreme court adopted the full opinion of the court of appeals,
and confirmed that the test for quantum meruit was whether the changed
conditions had been within the contemplation of the parties.4 The court
of appeals had held that the delays incurred by the contractor were not so
34. 83 Wash. 2d 7, 514 P.2d 1381 (1973).
35. Id. at 13, 514 P.2d at 1385.
36. Id., 514 P.2d at 1386. See also Bignold v. King County, 65 Wash. 2d 817, 822, 399 P.2d 611,
614-15 (1965) (holding that the "critical question" in a quantum meruit claim is whether the
contractor should have discovered or anticipated changed circumstances); Rowland Constr. Co. v.
Beall Pipe & Tank Corp., 14 Wash. App. 297,304,540 P.2d 912,917 (1975).
37. Edwards, 83 Wash. 2d at 13, 514 P.2d at 1386.
38. 17 Wash. App. 703, 566 P.2d 560 (1977). This opinion was adopted by the Washington
Supreme Court with accompanying clarifying text at 90 Wash. 2d 843, 586 P.2d 469 (1978).
39. 17 Wash. App. at 719, 566 P.2d at 569 (referring to a "no damage for delays" clause).
40. Id.
41. Nelse Mortensen & Co. v. Group Health Coop., 90 Wash. 2d 843, 845, 586 P.2d 469, 470
(1978). Note that the supreme court found it necessary to clarify the test being applied by the court
of appeals in this case, and did not mention the court of appeals's "controlling factor."
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unreasonable as to fall outside the scope of the contract and warrant
recovery in quantum meruit. Furthermore, the court of appeals had
noted that the contractor had extensive experience in building hospitals,
and thus should have known of the difficulties it would face on a
complicated job of this type.43
Thirteen years later, Hensel Phelps Construction Co. v. King County"
exacerbated the quandary over whether a quantum meruit action should
depend on the intention of the parties or on the contract documents. The
Hensel Phelps court focused on the contract documents, and held
recovery in quantum meruit to be inappropriate as a matter of law. In
Hensel Phelps, a painting subcontractor had entered into a written
contract for painting a county jail. Because of early delays in the project,
the general contractor ordered several changes in the scope of the
subcontractor's work.
These changes resulted in 1) an acceleration of each floor's time
deadline from 45 days to 19 days; 2) "stacking of Irades," meaning that
the subcontractor had to work in the same area and at the same time as
other subcontractors; 4 and 3) inefficiencies caused by previously
undiscovered problems with the jail's security-based design.46  But
despite the difficulties encountered, the subcontractor never asked for
time extensions or change orders. Rather, the subcontractor presented
claims for extra compensation almost daily, as permitted under the
subcontract, and received payment for practically every request.
47
The court of appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal of the
subcontractor's quantum meruit claim. It stated that quantum meruit is
based on the concept of mutual assent and its limits.4' That is, a
contractor cannot be presumed to have bargained away the right to claim
42. 17 Wash. App. at 726,566 P.2d at 572.
43. Id.; see also Lester N. Johnson Co. v. City of Spokane, 22 Wash. App. 265, 588 P.2d 1214
(1978), in which the court allowed recovery in quantum meruit, distinguishing Nelse Mortensen
because the key fact in Nelse Mortensen was the contractor's experience in hospital renovations. Id.
at 271, 588 P.2d at 1218.
44. 57 Wash. App. 170, 787 P.2d 58 (1990).
45. In its opinion, the court treated the inefficiencies and disrupticns caused by the stacking of
trades as being encompassed by the claim for stacking of trades, as opposed to being separate claims.
Id. at 177-79, 787 P.2d at 63-64.
46. The jail was designed to prevent escape by placing staircases from one floor to the next at
opposite ends of the building, forcing workers to walk across the length of the building to go from
one staircase to another. Id. at 172-73, 787 P.2d at 60.
47. Id. at 173, 787 P.2d at 60.
48. Id. at 174,787 P.2d at 61.
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damages resulting from uncontemplated changes.49 The court then
fashioned a new two-step plain meaning test for deciding quantum
meruit cases in construction litigation. The first step is to decide whether
the contract documents contain any ambiguity from which a trier of fact
could reasonably find that the changes were not contemplated by the
parties.5 If the court, by looking within the four corners5' of the
document, determines that the contract unambiguously contemplates the
changes, then no issue of fact exists and the quantum meruit claim must
be dismissed as a matter of law. If, on the other hand, the provisions
contain any ambiguity, issues of fact would exist, and resolution of the
question would be for the trier of fact. 2
Applying this test in Hensel Phelps, the court found no ambiguity in
the unusually extensive contract documents, and concluded that the
quantum meruit claim had been properly dismissed as a matter of law. 3
The court also stated that the magnitude of the changes was irrelevant to
the quantum meruit claim.54 Instead, the court asserted that the nature of
the problems encountered, not the magnitude, was determinative.55
Finally, the court rejected application of the "cardinal change" doctrine."
Under this doctrine, which is used primarily in federal cases, a contractor
may recover in quantum meruit when there has been a fundamental
alteration of the contract beyond its original scope.57 The Hensel Phelps
court refused to apply this doctrine because there had been no change in
the shape or square footage of painted surfaces.58
After Hensel Phelps, litigators may have wondered whether quantum
meruit recovery was essentially over for contractors in Washington.
However, Douglas Northwest Inc. v. Bill O'Brien & Sons Construction
59
may have limited application of the Hensel Phelps rationale to the facts
of that case. In Douglas, the trial court allowed a subcontractor on the
49. Id. Interestingly, this statement seems to suggest that quantum meruit should focus on the
contemplation of the parties, not on the contract documents themselves.
50. Id. at 175-76, 787 P.2d at 62.
51. "Four comers" is defined as "the face of a written instrument." Black's Law Dictionary 657
(6th ed. 1990).
52. HenselPhelps, 57 Wash. App. at 175-76, 787 P.2d at 62.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 181,787 P.2d at 65.
55. Id. at 181-82, 787 P.2d at 65.
56. Id. at 182-83, 787 P.2d at 65-66.
57. See Air-A-Plane Corp. v. United States, 408 F.2d 1030 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
58. 57 Wash. App. at 182-83, 787 P.2d at 65-66.
59. 64 Wash. App. 661, 828 P.2d 565 (1992).
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construction of an apartment complex to recover in quantum meruit for
labor and equipment inefficiencies 6 caused by the general contractor's
delays and interruptions. The court of appeals distinguished the
contractual provisions in Hensel Phelps as being "far more elaborate and
detailed" than the provisions in Douglas.61 Thus, the court refused to
find that any of the contractual provisions in Dou~glas addressed the
subcontractor's labor and equipment inefficiency claim. 2
Douglas left contractors and owners alike with at least two questions.
First, it was unclear whether contractors could simply label changes as
owner-caused labor and equipment inefficiencies, and thereby recover in
quantum neruit. Second, although Douglas referred to Hensel Phelps as
authority for when a quantum meruit claim could be properly dismissed
as a matter of law, 63 the opinion did not apply Hensel Phelps's plain
meaning test.64
D. Berg v. Hudesman
Several months after the decision in Hensel Phelps, the supreme court
addressed the issue of contract interpretation in Berg v. Hudesman.65 In
Berg, the court rejected the notion that contract terms can be
unambiguous on their face. The court pointed out that the meaning of
words depends on the context in which they are used. The court thus
insisted that words in a contract do not define themselves, and that
contractual terms cannot apply themselves to external objects and
performances.66 Consequently, in discerning the intentions of the parties,
the court stated that a trial court should not limit itself to the four comers
of the contract document, but should also look to the actual conduct of
the contracting parties and the reasonableness of the parties' respective
60. Inefficiencies occur on a construction project when the original cost/revenue schedule
becomes disrupted as a result of multiple owner-caused changes.
61. Douglas, 64 Wash. App. at 685, 828 P.2d at 579.
62. Id., 828 P.2d at 579-80. The court in Douglas said that the contr,.ct was "silent as to the type
of remedy available for O'Brien's labor and equipment inefficiency claim." Id.
63. Id. at 683, 828 P.2d at 578.
64. This is especially interesting since both decisions are from Division One of the Washington
Court of Appeals.
65. 115 Wash. 2d 657, 801 P.2d 222 (1990).
66. Id. at 664, 801 P.2d at 227 (citing 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 536, at 27-28 (1960)).
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interpretations of the contract.67 The court termed this the "context rule"
of contract interpretation.68
III. FUTURE QUANTUM MERUIT CASES SHOULD FOCUS ON
THE PARTIES' INTENTIONS
While Nelse Mortensen may have overemphasized the importance of
contractual clauses in addressing quantum meruit claims, the Hensel
Phelps court took this focus too far in adopting a plain meaning approach
to quantum meruit. These two cases are at odds with the historical and
philosophical underpinnings of quantum meruit, and with Berg. As a
result, future Washington courts must clarify the requirements of
quantum meruit recovery for future litigants. Rather than apply Hensel
Phelps's plain meaning analysis, future courts should follow Berg's lead
and interpret the parties' intentions in the context of their overall
relationship.
A. Nelse Mortensen Overemphasized Contractual Fine Print
According to the court in Nelse Mortensen, the sole controlling factor
in each delay case was the presence or absence of a clause that limited or
barred a contractor's claim for damages caused by the owner.69 The
Hensel Phelps opinion echoed this observation when it identified three
cases, including Tribble, as standing for the proposition that recovery in
quantum meruit has been allowed only in the absence of a contractual
provision on point.7"
Tribble proves that this "controlling factor" approach is erroneous if
applied to quantum meruit claims generally. In Tribble, the contractor
sued for damages caused by an owner's change in the line and grade of a
railroad. The contract specifically reserved the right of the railroad to
change the line and grade at any stage of work, and specifically set out
the contractor's remedy if such a change should increase the amount of
work to be performed.7 Thus, there existed an unambiguous contractual
provision directly addressing the difficulties that the contractor
67. Id. at 668, 801 P.2d at 229.
68. Id. at 667, 801 P.2d at 228.
69. Nelse Mortensen & Co. v. Group Health Coop., 17 Wash. App. 703, 719, 566 P.2d 560, 569
(1977).
70. Hensel Phelps Constr. Co. v. King County, 57 Wash. App. 170, 175,787 P.2d 58, 61 (1990).
71. Tribble v. Yakima Valley Transp., 100 Wash. 589, 593, 171 P. 544, 546 (1918).
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eventually encountered. Nevertheless, the supreme court allowed
recovery in quantum meruit because the work performed was beyond the
reasonable contemplation of the parties. 2
Consequently, the presence or absence of a clause that limits a
contractor's damages is not the controlling factor in Washington
construction quantum meruit cases. Rather, the factor that has
consistently been labeled as critical in the application of this doctrine is
whether the changes that occurred were witlin the reasonable
contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting.73 Nelse
Mortensen's contract-oriented focus disregarded the flexible and
equitable nature of quantum meruit. In a time when strict contract
remedies often left aggrieved parties without an adequate remedy at law,
quantum meruit developed as a doctrine that allowed judges the
flexibility74 to consider basic notions of fairness and to rectify an unjust
enrichment. Today, quantum meruit should allow Washington courts the
same flexibility to look beyond the strict contractual language in
ascertaining whether changes on a construction job have extended
beyond the original intentions of the parties.
Consider, for example, the quantum meruit recovery allowed a
nonbreaching party in a partially performed contnct. The underlying
rationale for this classic type of quantum meruit recovery is twofold.
First, the contractor has furnished something of value to the owner that
cannot be measured by the original contract. Second, furnishing a
partially built structure to the owner was not within the contemplation of
the contractor at the time of contracting. Reference to the original
contract documents urider these circumstances would be like throwing a
four-cornered document in the face of equity. One cannot reasonably
value a partially completed building when the contract contemplated the
entire house being built.7" The appropriate resolution is to allow the
contractor to abandon the contract, and to recover the fair market value
of the work performed to date.
72. See Schuehle v. City of Seattle, 199 Wash. 675, 682, 92 P.2d 1109, 1113 (1939); Lester N.
Johnson Co. v. Spokane, 22 Wash. App. 265, 588 P.2d 1214 (1978); Eouglas Northwest v. O'Brien
& Sons, 64 Wash. App. 661, 828 P.2d 565 (1992). These cases confirm that a contractual provision,
although arguably on point, is not always controlling.
73. See, e.g., Tribble, 100 Wash. at 597, 171 P. at 547; Bignold v. King County, 65 Wash. 2d 817,
826,399 P.2d 611, 614-15 (1965); Edwards Constr. v. Port of Tacoma, 83 Wash. 2d 7, 13, 514 P.2d
1381, 1386 (1973); HenselPhelps, 57 Wash. App. at 174,787 P.2d at 61.
74. Sloan concludes that quantum meruit demonstrates necessary flexibility in the law: "This
Article has been a chronicle of the evolution and current application of this flexibility. Quantum
meruit is equity's flexibility in law." Sloan, supra note 7, at 462.
75. For example, there is no realistic "fair market" for a roof and a frame.
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Similarly, in construction cases warranting application of quantum
meruit, contractors are not denying that they signed a contract. Rather,
they are suing "off the contract. ,76 That is, they are asking the courts to
look at the performance actually rendered, and are arguing that this
performance is substantially different from that originally contemplated.
In this sense, there are no longer any contractual terms that govern the
performance actually rendered. Contractors are electing to recover on an
implied agreement by the owner to pay the reasonable value of rendered
services.77
Following Nelse Mortensen, the Washington Legislature felt it
necessary to clarify that contractors may still elect to recover on this
implied agreement when appropriate, and cannot be held to have
contracted away their right to sue off the contract. The court of appeals
in Nelse Mortensen held that the contract did account for delays that the
trial court earlier had held to be outside the contemplation of the parties,
and hence unreasonable.7" Presumably, the Legislature feared Nelse
Mortensen would allow owners to use contractual clauses to artificially
bar contractors' rights to sue in quantum meruit. In 1979, the Legislature
enacted Washington Revised Code section 4.24.360, which states that
any clause in a construction contract that purports to waive, release, or
extinguish the rights of a contractor to damages or an equitable
adjustment arising out of unreasonable owner-caused delay is against
public policy, and thus void and unenforceable.
The difficulty with Nelse Mortensen arises from its distracting and
misguided language focusing on the contract documents rather than on
the overall relationship of the parties. The court attempted to reconcile
all prior cases involving delay and quantum meruit.79 This is a difficult,
if not impossible, task to perform in an area such as quantum meruit that
is riddled with equitable, fact-specific considerations."0 As a result, the
court's conclusion ignores prior precedent and mistakenly implies that a
76. A quantum meruit claim is not a breach of contract action. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
77. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
78. Nelse Mortensen & Co. v. Group Health Coop., 17 Wash. App. 703, 721, 566 P.2d 560, 570
(1977).
79. Although the Nelse Mortensen court primarily reviewed "delay" cases, some of which did not
even address quantum meruit, the court described its summary of the "pertinent cases" as falling
within one of two classes: "Either the contractual provisions involved have been applied to defeat an
attempted recovery by the contractor, or recovery has been allowed on the theory of quantum
meruit." 17 Wash. App. at 719,566 P.2d at 569.
80. See Sloan, supra note 7, at 43 1.
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quantum meruit claim should be decided by focusing on the contractual
fine print.
B. Hensel Phelps Missed the Mark
The Hensel Phelps court took Nelse Mortensen's contractual focus
another step by adopting an inflexible approach to quantum meruit
claims. First, the court's plain meaning analysis assumes courts can
ascertain the intentions of the parties when the words on the contract are
unambiguous. Words, however, have no fixed meaning." Second,
Hensel Phelps deemed the magnitude of changes irTelevant in quantum
meruit claims. Both of these determinations demonstrate an unrealistic
approach to contract interpretation and a misundertanding of quantum
meruit. Unless clarified by future Washington courts, Hensel Phelps will
continue to be used by owners to put a de facto end to quantum meruit
claims in the state.82 Moreover, artificially stifling quantum meruit
claims may have undesirable effects on the cost of construction, the
accuracy of assessing damages in legitimate construction claims, and
contractors' abilities to fairly represent their claims in court.
1. Hensel Phelps's Plain Meaning Test is Unrealitic
Hensel Phelps not only misconstrued prior Washington cases, but also
created a plain meaning approach to addressing quantum meruit claims
that is unrealistic as a means of determining whether changes on a
construction project went beyond the original cDntemplation of the
parties. In a startling move, the court of appeals stated that trial courts
should first look to the four comers of the contract to see if the contract
unambiguously addresses the changes or disruptions experienced by the
complaining party.83 If so, the quantum meruit claim must be dismissed
for lack of a genuine issue of fact.84
This plain meaning test mirrors the rigid common law remedial
limitations that quantum meruit was designed to prevent. The whole
point of quantum meruit in construction cases is to look to the true
81. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
82. The author has attended several mediations, for example, in which owners have seized on the
language in Hensel Phelps and have simply distributed the Hensel Pheips opinion and excerpts from
the Wiley Construction Law Treatise, supra note 4, to impress upon contractors how Hensel Phelps
has essentially eviscerated quantum meruit recovery for contractors in Washington.
83. Hensel Phelps Constr. v. King County, 57 Wash. App. 170, 175-76,787 P.2d 58, 62 (1990).
84. Id.; see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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contemplation of the parties and provide equitable relief when the actual
performance has gone beyond these original contemplations. Apparently
the court believed such contemplations can be ascertained when the
words in a contract are unambiguous. However, developments in the use
of parol, or extrinsic, evidence in interpreting contracts" have shown that
this is an unrealistic approach to ascertaining the intentions of the parties.
Thus, a look at how the Berg decision, commentators, and judges have
resolved the use of parol evidence in contract interpretation is helpful in
understanding why Hensel Phelps's plain meaning analysis should not
control future quantum meruit claims.
In Berg, the supreme court explicitly rejected the notion that the
contemplation of the parties can be ascertained from within the four
corners of the contract documents. The court emphasized the need to
look beyond the contract documents, and to examine the context in
which the contract was drafted.86 Hensel Phelps's plain meaning test for
quantum meruit claims is thus directly at odds with the Berg court's
observation that words in a contract can have several different meanings
in the absence of an understanding of the context in which the words
were used by the parties.
Commentators have been no less critical of the plain meaning
approach. For example, Corbin, Williston, and the Restatement of
Contracts all suggest that courts should examine the circumstances
surrounding the execution of a writing, even when the writing appears
unambiguous on its face.87 A Washington commentator endorsed and
explained this view by stating that looking beyond the supposedly
unambiguous contract language is the only way to yield interpretations
that coincide with the meanings actually contemplated by the parties.8
Further, the current consensus among judges in the area of contract
interpretation confirms the notion that ascertaining the intentions of the
parties from the face of a document alone is unrealistic. In rejecting the
85. This is not to be confused with the parol evidence rule, which relates to the question of
integration and the role of parol evidence in ascertaining whether the contract documents were
intended as a partial or a complete expression of all terms of the parties' agreement. Berg v.
Hudesman, 115 Wash. 2d 657, 670, 801 P.2d 222,230 (1990).
86. Id. at 668, 801 P.2d at 229; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
87. Arthur Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 536 (1950); 3 Samuel Williston & George J.
Thompson, A Treatise on the Lmv of Contracts §§ 609, 618, 629 (rev. ed. 1936); Restatement,
Contracts § 230 (1932); see also 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2461-2462 (1981); 2 E. Farnsworth,
Contracts § 7.12, at 277-78 (1990); U.C.C. § 2-202 comment 2.
88. Warren L. Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-1957: Part II, 34 Wash. L. Rev. 345,
374-76 (1959).
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plain meaning approach, Justice Traynor explained how a contract
document may help one adduce the intentions of the parties, but by itself
cannot conclusively establish the parties' intentions:
If words had absolute and constant referents, it might be possible to
discover contractual intention in the words them:elves and in the
manner in which they were arranged. Words, however, do not have
absolute and constant referents. . . . The meanng of particular
words or groups of words varies with the verbal context and
surrounding circumstances and purposes in view of the linguistic
education and experience of their users and their hearers or readers
(not excluding judges).89
2. The Nature of the Changes in a Quantum Merui, Claim Should
Include Magnitude
The Hensel Phelps court also rejected the subcontractor's claim that
the magnitude of delay in that case was great enough to warrant recovery
in quantum meruit. According to the court, the focus should be on the
nature, not the magnitude,9" of the delay. As a result, the court stated it
was irrelevant that the subcontractor used nearly three times the amount
of labor hours originally contemplated to perform its contract
obligations, or that it used 26 painters instead of nine. Because the
nature of the problems encountered by the subcontractor was supposedly
addressed by the contract, the court found no basis for abandoning the
contract in favor of quantum meruit."
Taking Hensel Phelps's approach to its log.,cal extreme, if a
subcontractor used 10,000 times the amount of labor hours originally
contemplated to perform its contractual obligations, the court would
nevertheless deny recovery in quantum meruit. According to Hensel
Phelps, magnitude even of this degree is irrelevant despite the
astronomical inequities. Perhaps the problem initially lies in the fact that
the Hensel Phelps court used the word "nature" as if it necessarily
89. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal.
1968). See also Justice Holmes's statement that "a word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged;
it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918), and
Thomas M. Palay, A Contract Does Not a Contract Make, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 561 (explaining that
focusing on the contractual relation of the parties is a better way to understand what actually
transpired between the parties than focusing on the terms of the contract documents).
90. Hensel Phelps Constr. v. King County, 57 Wash. App. 170, 181-82,787 P.2d 58, 65 (1990).
91. Id. at 181-82, 787 P.2d at 65.
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excluded magnitude. This is simply unwarranted, and ignores prior case
law. The Hensel Phelps court failed to note that the Rowland court
focused on the magnitude of changes when denying recovery in quantum
meruit. 2 Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that when the Nelse
Mortensen court used the word "nature"' in describing the parties'
contemplations, it meant to exclude the concept of magnitude. In fact, in
a section entitled "The Nature of the Delays," the court emphasized the
number of individual delay claims brought by the contractor.94
If courts begin turning a blind eye to magnitude, contractors may
circumvent the Hensel Phelps plain meaning test by simply providing a
different name for the changes that occurred. For example, contractors
could bring a claim for "inefficiencies" caused by owners' actions,95 or
for owner-caused "impact costs. ' 96 Since the terms "inefficiencies" and
"impact costs" may not unambiguously appear on the face of a contract,
the court could not find them to be contemplated by the parties under a
plain meaning approach. Such semantic games would be a natural
reaction to Hensel Phelps's unrealistic assumption that the words on a
contract establish the complete boundaries of the parties' intentions.
In the long run, a plain meaning approach to quantum meruit claims
may cause an increase in the cost of residential and commercial housing.
If the courts ignore the true intentions of the parties, then contractors will
have to be unrealistic in figuring their bids. Without an avenue for
recourse in the event of substantial changes, contractors will begin
building a contingency97 into their bids in order to self-insure for the
possibility of changes that go beyond the original intentions of the
parties. The purpose of "changed site conditions" clauses in government
92. S. L. Rowland Constr. Co. v. Beall Pipe & Tank Corp., 14 Wash. App. 297, 305, 540 P.2d
912, 917-18 (1975). Hensel Phelps did not discuss Rowland in its discussion of the irrelevance of
magnitude.
93. See Nelse Mortensen & Co. v. Group Health Coop., 17 Wash. App. 703, 727, 566 P.2d 560,
573 (1977) (holding that if "owner-caused delay in construction was of a nature contemplated by the
parties, and specific provisions of their contract provide a remedy, or the contract otherwise supplies
a means of compensation for such delay, then the delay cannot be deemed unreasonable to the extent
the contract terms should be abandoned in favor of quantum meruit recovery").
94. Id. at 710-13, 566 P.2d at 564-65.
95. This appears to be exactly what the contractor did in Douglas Northwest v. O'Brien & Sons,
64 Wash. App. 661, 685, 828 P.2d 565, 579-80 (1992), in which the court could not find a remedy
for labor and equipment inefficiencies within the four coumers of the contract, and thus found
quantum meruit to be appropriate.
96. "Impact costs" occur on a project when the original cost/revenue schedule becomes disrupted
as.a result of multiple owner-caused changes.
97. A "contingency" in this context refers to an inflation of the contractor's original bid amount.
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construction contracts, for example, is to remove some of the gamble on
subsurface conditions.9" With this clause, contractors do not need to
consider how large a contingency should be added to the bid in order to
cover the risk of changed site conditions.99  With quantum meruit
available, the public benefits from more accurate bidding because
contractors need not inflate their bids for risks that may not
materialize.00 Artificial contingencies create higher building costs, and
these higher costs eventually translate into higher residential and
commercial rental and building costs.
3. An Illustration
A brief example may help illustrate the flaws and dangers of the
Hensel Phelps approach to quantum meruit claims. Imagine a contract
between an owner and a contractor to build a ore-story house on an
ordinary looking piece of land. This hypothetical contractor has built
hundreds of houses and is accustomed to the minor or inconsequential
changes in plans that are necessary for the practical performance of a
contract to build a house. Moreover, the contract between these parties
contains a provision for something as specific as unanticipated wet
subsurface conditions encountered by the contractor.
Now, imagine that after two weeks on the job, the contractor hits a
natural spring while digging the foundation for the house.' Through no
fault of the contractor, water covers the entire construction site, causing
chaos on the job and miring down the contractor's labor and equipment
to the point of absurdity. However, in the interest of finishing the house
in a reasonable amount of time, the contractor lires extra workers to
clean the site and finish the job. Although the contractor asks for time
extensions to avoid being assessed liquidated damages, the delays and
extra effort caused by the water have resulted in substantial loss to the
contractor. In the end, the owner receives the desired house for the
original contract price, whereas the contractor loses a substantial amount
of money.
98. "Subsurface condition" refers to the condition of the earth ma:erial that the contractor must
build upon or remove; including, for example, density, soddenness, or 1he presence of boulders.
99. Foster Constr. v. United States, 435 F.2d 873, 887 (Ct. CI. 1970).
100. Id.
101. For the purposes of this hypothetical, assume a reasonably prudent contractor in this
contractor's position could not have anticipated the presence of a natural spring.
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If the contractor brings a quantum meruit claim, the owner will argue
that the "unanticipated subsurface water" clause in the contract could not
be more unambiguous. However, the parties did not contemplate the
possibility of an underground spring, and the contractual provision does
not truly reflect what the parties were bargaining over. In such a case,
the owner should be bound, by the ties of natural justice, to relinquish the
unjustified benefits received at the contractor's expense. That is,
quantum meruit should allow the court the flexibility to look beyond the
supposedly unambiguous contractual language, and rule that a substantial
change occurred that went beyond the contemplation of the parties.
4. Calculation ofDamages in a Quantum Meruit Claim
Quantum meruit provides the most accurate method for calculating a
contractor's damages in a case such as the above hypothetical. The
nature of the construction business makes it practically impossible to
quantify the damages caused by any single occurrence. Even when an
expert attempts to quantify labor and equipment inefficiencies caused by
substantial changes, it is extremely difficult to accurately estimate the
inefficiencies. In contrast, quantum meruit provides the court an
accurate and straightforward method of compensating a contractor. The
courts will look at what the contractor has spent'02 in performing the
contract, and will add a reasonable profit.
Some cases have mentioned that this "total cost" method of recovery
is disfavored because it assumes that the contractor's actual expenditures
are reasonable.0 3 Both legal policy and common business sense militate
against such a negative approach to the total cost method of figuring
damages in a quantum meruit construction claim. First, with regard to
legal policy, the decision in Edwards Construction v. Port of Tacoma'14
is instructive. The Edwards court stated that the reasonable costs
allowed by the trial court were appropriate.0 5 If a contractor incurs
102. This would include labor, equipment, materials, and overhead (both at the home office and at
the site).
103. See, e.g., S. L. Rowland Constr. Co. v. Beall Pipe & Tank Corp., 14 Wash. App. 297,
303-04, 540 P.2d 912, 917 (1975); Modem Builders, Inc. v. Manke, 27 Wash. App. 86, 93, 615 P.2d
1332, 1337 (1980) (stating that the "total cost basis is not a favored method of recovery when an
express contract exists"). The court in Rowland apparently used the phrase "total cost method"
interchangeably with the concept of quantum meruit. However, the total cost method refers to the
method for calculating damages in a quantum meruit action in which the trier of fact has first
determined that the threshold "substantial changes" have occurred.
104. 83 Wash. 2d 7, 514 P.2d 1381 (1973).
105. Id. at 15, 514 P.2d at 1386.
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substantial damages, but the exact amount in dollars cannot be proved,
the injured party will not be denied a remedy in damages because of lack
of certainty. 0 6 The court in Lester N. Johnson Co. v. Spokane echoed
this statement,0 7 explaining that since the term "quantum meruit"
literally means "as much as deserved," any method of calculating cost
that results in a reasonable estimate of the value of the additional work is
proper. 8 This makes sense in light of the fictional promise on the part
of the owner to pay the reasonable value of any rendered services.
Second, the assumption that contractors' costs are reasonable is
justified based on the inherent profit motivations that drive most business
persons. Contractors are generally operating under the assumption that
they will get paid a certain sum for specified work. if they do not spend
money wisely, they will not make a profit. Thus, it is inherently in the
best interests of contractors to keep their costs reasonable. 9
Furthermore, in most cases warranting application of quantum meruit,
any other method of figuring damages is simply unfair to contractors
because it forces them to essentially try a large number of individual
cases. For example, if a quantum meruit claim involves 80 individual
changes,"0 forcing the contractor to prosecute 80 separate mini-trials on
each claim would effectively deprive the contractor of a fair recovery.
One need look no further than Rowland, in which the trial court broke
down the contractor's action into 35 separate claims, which resulted in a
three-month trial."' Miring the fact-finder in the minutia of calculating
the cost of every change that occurred will likely confuse, and possibly
mislead, a jury. Thus, allowing recovery in quantum meruit enhances
accuracy and saves judicial resources.
106. Id.
107. 22 Wash. App. 265,273,588 P.2d 1214, 1219 (1978).
108. Id. at 274, 588 P.2d at 1220.
109. Although contractors may overbid or mistakenly bid a job, competition in the bidding
process provides contractors an inherent interest in keeping their bids mistake-free since overly high
bids may prevent contractors from receiving the contract, and mistakenly low bids will preclude
contractors from realizing their intended profits.
110. In the above hypothetical, for instance, it might be that the water caused 80 different
deviations from the original plans of the contractor.
111. S. L. Rowland Constr. v. Beall Pipe & Tank Corp., 14 Wash. App. 297, 299, 540 P.2d 912,
914 (1975). The Hensel Phelps trial (a quantum meruit claim tried to ajury) lasted only three weeks.
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IV. A PROPOSAL FOR HANDLING QUANTUM MERUIT CLAIMS
If future Washington cases do not explicitly reject Hensel Phelps's
plain meaning approach to quantum meruit claims, or at least clarify
quantum meruit recovery for contractors, trial courts may erroneously
view the case as a proper application of quantum meruit. Rather than
myopically focusing on the contract documents, future Washington
courts should emulate how the courts treated quantum meruit claims
prior to Nelse Mortensen: They should focus on the relation of the
parties.
From Tribble to Edwards, Washington courts allowed a unique type
of quantum meruit recovery. This occurred despite full performance,
despite contractual provisions on point, and without the courts explaining
what specific theory of quantum meruit recovery they were applying.
This is praise, not criticism. By focusing on the contemplation of the
parties, pre-Nelse Mortensen Washington cases were essentially taking a
relational view"' of contract interpretation in construction quantum
meruit claims. That is, they were not attempting to ascertain the
intentions of the parties by a strict reading of the contractual language.
The courts realized that in the construction business, in which
unanticipated problems are more the norm than the exception, it makes
more sense to take an elastic approach to contract interpretation.
Therefore, in construction quantum meruit claims, courts should
interpret the parties' intentions in the context of their overall relationship.
Not only was this the approach taken by courts prior to Nelse Mortensen,
but this "relational" method of contract interpretation is also in accord
with the contextual principles of interpretation underlying the Berg
decision. Berg adopted the Restatement (Second) of Contracts' proposal
for determining the intentions of the parties, which emphasizes the
importance of looking at "the situation and relations of the parties." '
This relational approach does not render the contract documents
unimportant.t Under such an approach, the contract documents remain
112. The relational view of contract law holds that the law should impose a greater duty of
cooperation on the parties after contract formation because that is what most parties expect when
entering significant contracts, regardless of what words are found on the face of the contract
documents. Wolcher, supra note 15, at 808 n.51.
113. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 212, 214(c) (1981). Accord Ian R. Macneil,
Relational Contract: ihat We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 483, 502 ("we cannot even
understand a promise outside its relational context").
114. See Ian R. Macneil, The New Social Contract, An Inquiry into Modem Contractual Relations
86 (1980).
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an essential factor in the analysis. Parties have the fundamental right to
contract with one another, and to rely on the courts to enforce those
words that the parties have chosen to best integrate their agreement.
However, the plain meaning or ambiguity of the contract language itself
should not be an overly important factor, given that words have no fixed
meaning outside the relationship of the parties. Certainly any supposed
plain meaning should not be more important than the parties' true
intentions.
Furthermore, inherent in the parties' scope of contracting powers is
the limitation of the parties' contemplations. That i3, by definition, the
parties cannot contract for contingencies that are "off the contract." The
contract should thus be only one element of the analysis in quantum
meruit claims. Only by looking at the context in which the partieg have
contracted can a court determine whether changes that occurred were
within, or beyond, the scope of the parties' intentions at the time of
contracting.
V. THE CURRENT STATUS OF QUANTUM MERUIT IN
WASHINGTON
It is important that future Washington courts understand the flaws in
Nelse Mortensen and Hensel Phelps, and that they clarify quantum
meruit recovery for future construction litigants. Even though
clarification is certainly warranted in light of Berg, actually overruling
Hensel Phelps may not be necessary. Both the Nelse Mortensen and
Hensel Phelps courts employed equitable considerations that, even with a
proper application of quantum meruit, may have yielded the same results.
In Nelse Mortensen, if the controlling factor had been the
contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting, the case may have
yielded the same results because, as the court stated, "an experienced
hospital contractor such as Mortensen should have known of the general
difficulties to be faced."" 5 In the eyes of the court, the equities may not
have been in Mortensen's comer.'
1 6
Similarly, application of quantum meruit may not have been
appropriate in Hensel Phelps. For example, the court made it clear that
115. Nelse Mortensen & Co. v. Group Health Coop., 17 Wash. App. '703, 726, 566 P.2d 560, 572
(1977).
116. Additionally, the court in Nelse Mortensen noted that "78 of the items claimed for delay
resulted in change orders for which nearly $600,000 had already been paid." Id. at 721, 566 P.2d at
570.
Vol. 69:431, 1994
Quantum Meruit for Contractors
the subcontractor presented written claims for extras almost daily, as
permitted under the subcontract, and was paid for nearly everything
asked." 7 The subcontractor appeared to know how to obtain monetary
relief under the subcontract at the time of performance. Thus, the
subcontractor acted inconsistently by later asking to abandon this same
subcontract in favor of a duplicate recovery in quantum meruit.
VI. CONCLUSION
Quantum meruit enables courts to provide remedies in construction
disputes without turning a blind eye to equity. At times, the contract is
the sole remedy for a contractor. There are, however, times when equity
demands allowing contractors to abandon their contracts in favor of
quantum meruit because the changes that occurred on a construction
project were not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of
contracting. Nelse Mortensen and Hensel Phelps should not be seen as
the last word on quantum meruit recovery in construction disputes in
Washington. The Berg decision confirms that Hensel Phelps's plain
meaning approach to contract interpretation is unrealistic, and should be
short lived in the line of construction quantum meruit cases. A
clarification of quantum meruit and an explicit adoption of a relational
approach to quantum meruit claims is appropriate in future Washington
cases because of quantum meruit's ability to provide the courts with an
accurate and flexible means of preventing injustice in construction
disputes.
117. The subcontractor was paid approximately $120,000. Hensel Phelps Constr. v. King County,
57 Wash. App. 170, 173, 787 P.2d 58, 60 (1990).
